In 1936 the USSR acquired a production license for the Vultee V-11, the first copies to serve as the basis for production in 1937. These were studied in detail by the TsAGI and the NII VVS.
After evaluating the V-11G, it was decided to proceed to series production to become familiar with the construction.
The serial production Vultee V-11, under the designation Kochierigin BSh-1 (Russian: Кочеригин БШ-1), was assigned to the OKB-1 construction brigade under the leadership of SA Kochierigin. The initials BSh-1 corresponded to Attack Bomber – 1 (in Russian: Б омбaрдировщик- Ш турмовик первый). In addition to preparing Factory No.1 to produce the model (with the help of a number of American specialists), Kochierigin had the responsibilities of replacing the original engine with the domestically produced Shvietsov M-62, bringing all the equipment and weapons to the Soviet standard.
Replacing the Wright SR-1820-G2 engine with the Shvietsov M-62 did not present major drawbacks as both were versions of the Wright Cyclone R-1820-F. The USSR had acquired a production license for the SR-1820-F3 for production under the designation Shvietsov M-25. The Shvietsov M-62 differed little from the American engine in terms of dimensions and location of mounting points. The VISh-2PA propeller, selected for the BSh-1, was also not very different from the Hamilton Vultee V-11, as it was also a licensed development.
The project of the Soviet BSh-1 modification began even before the arrival of the specimens in the USSR. On March 22, 1937 Kochierigin discussed his model transformation project. Instead of the 12.7 mm Browning machine guns in the wings, it was planned to place four ShKAS of similar caliber, but with a higher rate of fire. For each pair of machine guns 1600 shots were planned in trunks displaced to the side. The casings were ejected under the wing and the tapes were collected in the trunks. It was proposed to replace the gunner’s firing point with a turret similar to that used on the SR reconnaissance aircraft. Its dimensions made it possible to maintain the shape of the fuselage and the original glazing of the cabin. This modification was not approved.
The lower hatch installation for the gunner was developed from that used on the Ilyushin DB-3. This position had 500 shots.
Bomb capacity was also altered. Inside the fuselage two KD-1-8 cassettes with 8 fixings each were installed. This allowed the use of small aviation bombs between 5 and 25 kg. Unlike the original North American production cassettes that were fixed to the fuselage, the new KD-1-8 cassettes could be moved. The loading of bombs was done in the extended position and then they were collected towards the interior of the belly by means of a system of winches. For the external fixation of bombs in the lower part of the centerplane, two rows of 10 Der-31 mounts capable of supporting bombs up to 100 kg were installed. Bomb release was by an ESBR-2 electrical device with a mechanical reserve system similar to that used on the Kochierigin/Yatsenko DI-6Sh.
Only the installation of the chemical weapons dispensers remained a pending task.
The VVS made the decision on April 15 not to modify the firing point of the gunner, changing only the machine gun for a DA with 750 shots; decrease the number of underwing supports to 8 as in the North American version. On the other hand, urgently develop the necessary modifications to install two DAP-100 chemical weapons dispensers in the fuselage and six VAP-4 cassettes (four in the fuselage and two under the wing consoles).
Supporters of radical modifications to the VVS requested for the first serial copies to replace the machine gun not with the DA, but with a strapped ShKAS. Later install an armored turret. It was also requested to incorporate a radio-compass, which for the time was a luxury. It was proposed to develop the model in three versions: attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft and bomber. In the last two cases the crew would be three people. The attack plane would carry 4 machine guns in the wings, the bomber and scout plane would carry only two.
The industry ruled against the profound changes. The delays of the modifications affected the fulfillment of the plans. It was proposed to develop the first series with minimal modifications and then introduce modernizations and changes.
Finally, this was the point of view that prevailed and in the resolution of the Defense Committee of November 11, 1937 it was established that all the examples produced until the end of 1938 would be attack versions with four ShKAS machine guns in the wings with 2400 rounds in total. Degtiariov light machine gun for aviation in the gunner’s position in the original North American installation and without the ventral position. Two KD-1-8 cassettes and eight Der-31 outer mounts were to be installed in the bomb bay.
The Soviet armament was installed in the North American example number 32. In Factory No.1 the Browning machine guns were replaced by four ShKAS with 600 rounds per gun. An aviation Degtiaryov light machine gun with 500 rounds was installed in the rear cabin. To install the KD-1-8 cassettes it was necessary to widen the hatches by 350 mm and cover the front wall with aluminum. Each cassette could be fitted with 8 AO-8MZ, AO-8MB, AO-10, AO-15 or ZAB-10TG bombs. After installing the KD-1-8 the bomb capacity of the BSh-1 decreased slightly from 272 to 260 kg. The US underwing mounts were replaced by Soviet Der-31s. These mounts could carry bombs from AO-10 up to FAB-100 of 100 kg. Installation of the ESBR-2 electrical release system with a backup mechanical system allowed the release of the bombs one at a time, in series, or all at once.
In October 1937, factory tests were carried out with the new armament on “32”. Difficulties arose with the electrical system for releasing the bombs. Another defect found was the impossibility of locating bombs weighing more than 25 kg in the last row of external supports as they collided with the ground. With these defects the aircraft was sent to the Aviation Armament Scientific-Research Park (NIPAV) (Russian: Научно-испытательный полигон авиационного вооружения (НИПАВ)).
17 test flights were carried out with bombs dropped and weapons fired. It could be determined that the substitution of the gunner’s Browning machine gun for the DA did not increase the effectiveness of this position. On the other hand, there were problems with the KD-1-8 cassettes because sometimes the bombs got stuck between the cassette and the cell wall.
The NKAP attached great importance to the production of the BSh-1. It was expected for the year 1937 itself to have two series ready. The plan for 1938 included 200 examples in the light bomber version and 150 as attack aircraft, the first 10 of which should be delivered in the first quarter. In the second quarter, 20 BSh-1s were to be delivered and should be assigned to the Leningrad Military District. It was planned to equip the light bombardment aviation regiments of the Leningrad, Byelorussian, Kiev and Moscow districts with this new model. Each regiment had to have 63 copies.
Serial production was envisioned at its own Factory No.1 in Moscow, which had previously produced large numbers of Polikarpov R-5SSS and RZ reconnaissance aircraft. This meant an important technological change as there was a big difference between the technological processes of Nikolai Polikarpov’s wooden planes and the all-metal Vultee V-11.
In December 1937, the OKB-1 finished preparing all the detailed plans of the BSh-1, including all the changes in the armament, the substitution of the original materials for others of national production and began the construction of the first copies. By January15, the preparation of the jobs necessary to achieve the production of 8-10 aircraft per month and achieve the delivery of 50 copies for the first semester should be completed.
In practice, things did not go as planned. Preparation for production was delayed, the use of new materials, innovative technology, the introduction of modern electrically-powered machines never before used in Soviet industry, and the low qualification of personnel seriously complicated the construction process.
A large number of pieces had been received already made from the United States and did not match Soviet standards due to the difference in units of measurement. The first five examples were produced practically from these parts, and despite this they were characterized by a large number of defects that caused problems during testing.
Externally the BSh-1 differed only from the V-11G in the engine with side lattices on the cowl and the propeller hub. Practically all the equipment was Soviet, the motor starting system, the electric generator, the collimators, the bomb launchers were replaced. Although the cabin was quite quiet, an SPU-2 intercom system and SL-36 signal lamps were installed. An attempt was made to replace the Fairchild F-14 photographic apparatus with an AFA-21 in an attack aircraft version and the AFA-27 in a bomber version, but then it was decided to use a single AFA-13. An RSB (Dvina) radio station with antenna attached to a 500mm mast located above the cockpit deck was installed.
After the arrest of the head of the VVS Yakov I. Álksnis, accused of treason, the head of supply of the VVS Yoffe, who replaced the also arrested Bazienkov, wrote a letter on November 29, 1937 to the new director of the VVS AD Loktionov in which he proposed to increase the ammunition of the BSh-1 to 3600 shots, to locate an MV-3 turret with ShKAS machine gunsin the gunner’s position with 600 shots and another in the lower position with 500 shots. He also proposed eliminating the external bombs and increasing the internal capacity to four KF-1-8 cassettes by dooming the fuselage fuel tank. It was proposed to add four VAP-4 chemical weapons containers or a pair of DAP-100.
This was the configuration of the series devices that began to be delivered in the second half of 1938. This configuration had been tested at Factory No.1 on the “32” aircraft in November 1937. All the requests were made without problems except for the installation of the chemical weapons system. The installation of the VAP-4 under the centerplane was extremely risky due to the low height above the ground, only 200 mm. Its location under the wings led to structural modifications to the wing.
Testing of these canisters at NIPAV showed that the airflow from the propeller influenced the chemicals released. During these tests the entire tail was filled with splashes of the colored water used instead of the dangerous liquid.
As early as January 1938, there was talk of reducing production of the BSh-1 to just 100 examples and then continuing production of a modernized model. In March, the VVS confirmed the characteristics of the modernized version, which included the modifications proposed by Yoffe and other additions such as armor for the pilot’s seat and replacement of the M-62 engine with an M-62R.
The OKB-1 prepared the modifications. On April 27, 1938, the model analysis commission approved these changes with minor modifications. On March 28, the modification of “33” began. Among the modifications introduced was the increase in the trunks of the machine guns to increase the number of projectiles with the installation of electrical systems in this armament, the installation of 4 KD-1-10 cassettes, a new PAK-1 collimator for the pilot and a new ASBR-2 bomb delivery system.
Four Der-31 mounts were installed under the fuselage and two under the wing consoles. This led to reinforcing the wing consoles. The M-62 engine was kept as the M-62R was not ready, nor was the seat armor installed.
An MV-5 turret was installed but not in the standard form, but with smaller dimensions. The gunner was pretty tight.
Work on the new version was going slowly. The OKB-1 was working in parallel on the R-9 and the factory management considered the development of the Vultee little prospect. On the other hand, the new KD-1-10 bomb mounts and the new turret were not received. By June 13, it had only been possible to install the electrical systems in two of the machine guns, since there were no others. Only for September 27 could an example of the M-62R engine be received and a normal MV-5 turret was located.
Series production of the modernized model was already postponed to 1939. Meanwhile the Factory no. 1 was still producing the “old” model. At the end of December, the factory director contacted the VVS management to inform him that he would not build the modernized BSh-1. The production management, for its part, ordered the Factory to deliver the first 50 copies and stop production. The military did not protest this time. Despite the fact that their request was for 350 machines and not 50, interest in receiving these technically aging and useless aircraft had been lost.
At the beginning of 1939 a BSh-1 with M-62IR engine (with compressor and reducer) was delivered to state tests with ski and wheel landing gear. The aircraft was tested by Major BN Pokrovsky and Captain ID Sololov as a gunner. Already by that time the BSh-1 was surpassed by an important group of national designs. In relation to the original Vultee V-11G it was heavier and the engine power had decreased. The North American SR-1820 developed 850 hp at 1,676 meters and the M-62IR barely achieved 450 hp at 1,500 m, but due to unreliability this power could hardly be achieved. As a result of the poor quality of production, the excellent visibility of theVultee V-11 had been faded into the BSh-1 by poor quality domestic plexiglass. The retraction of the landing gear presented major problems: during the tests on 10 occasions the gear did not deploy or did so incompletely.
By 1939 the BSh-1 had no military value. The possibility of its use was further removed due to the excellent results of the Nieman R-10 and the appearance of Sukhoi BB-1 (future Su-2). As a result the VVS refused to take the BSh-1 into service.
By this time, Factory No.1 had completed the production of 50 copies. The historian Shavrov has written that only 38 were completed, suggesting that perhaps the rest had not been completed by the time the order to stop production was received. Finished models without engines long lined up on the side of the runway at the Moscow Central Airfield.
In order not to lose the work done, it was proposed to Aeroflot to use the aircraft as a mail plane.
The Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet (GU GVF) had been interested in the model since 1937, delivering the document with the requirements for the civil version.
The GVF plan for 1937 included the conversion of three V-11 machines with a budget of 400,000 rubles each. Long delays in getting the model ready for production derailed these plans.
By the end of 1938 it was already clear to the Defense Committee the disinterest of the VVS in the model, which is why the transfer of 30 unarmed copies to civil aviation was allowed in December. On December 31, the Economic Council allocated a budget of 15 million rubles to the GU GVF for this task. Civilian machines were officially given the designation PS-43 (Russian: Кочеригин ПС-43).
In practice the planes were still piled up at the aerodrome. For them there were no engines. The M-62IR was produced at a slow pace and its poor quality forced it to be constantly replaced. Priorities were assigned to the VVS, so the GVF had no choice but to wait.
The first converted example were flown in April 1939. By September 1, Aeroflot only had two Vultees: one in the special operations squadron and another used on the Kazakhstan – South route. The plane of the special operations squadron was assigned in the winter of 1939-1940 to the Special Group for the support of the troops during the Winter War with Finland.
In 1940 this example was delivered to the NII GVF for the development of tests that were developed by AA Kolosov. By June 15, Aeroflot had 23 PS-43 examples, although not all were in flight condition. Having spent years outdoors had affected them. At least 27 were converted.
For this reason and the lack of availability of engines by the end of 1940, it was necessary to transfer 16 copies to storage. Despite this, between the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941, several PS-43s were delivered to Aeroflot , operating on the Moscow – Kiev, Moscow – Tashkent and Kiev – Odessa routes.
Civilian pilots valued the new model positively, highlighting the comfort of the cockpit and the good layout of the equipment and instruments. The gear retraction system also received quite positive feedback. Under these conditions it was decided to propose developing a passenger version on the PS-43 with capacity for 6 people.
The start of the Great Patriotic War meant that Aeroflot’s PS-43 fleet was destined for the transport of military cargo. As of June 25, 1941, new units and special brigades were organized and assigned to front units.
The first two units of the leadership of the Ukrainian civilian fleet were assigned to the Kiev aviation group and by July 1 they had already been shot down. This group would later receive a third copy.
A curious case is a PS-43 that somehow was registered in the 69th fighter regiment that operated in Odessa as part of an attack squadron. It is unknown how this aircraft was armed but it is known that it operated in conjunction with four Ilyushin Il-2s, one Polikarpov R-5 and one ex-Yugoslav Savoia S.79.
During the evacuation from Odessa in October 1941 this example flew to the Crimea, but was damaged on landing. Pilot Major Rykachiev and passengers were unharmed, but the plane had to be decommissioned.
As of June 1941, the PS-43 were concentrated in the 2nd Squadron of the Muscovite Group of Special Operations (MAGON). In the month of June, 8 copies were received, followed by 4 in August and another 8 in September. This was the result of the work of the GVF specialists who, with a forced march, prepared and maintained the stored specimens lined up on the Central Aerodrome runway.
The works were led by engineer IA Ivanov. Aircraft were delivered to the unit by pilots PS Gusiev, VN Ilin, VS Mineyev. Some examples could not be recovered due to an accident that occurred during the landing of a MiG-3.
The PS-43 were basically used for the transfer of mail and officialdom. On August 13, 1941 a PS-43 flown by VS Mineyev was attacked by a Messerschmitt Bf-109 . For half an hour the pilot was maneuvering until he finally managed to escape from the German, but these happy cases were not the most common. Due to German air supremacy the group suffered heavy casualties.
In July one was lost and another the following month. Two more aircraft were lost in September. Due to this the PS-43 began to be armed with defensive machine gunners in the rear position. Aircraft mechanics or men from the postal service were used in the role of artillerymen.
As the Germans approached Moscow, the MAGON group was used quite successfully in recon missions. On September 25, 1941, the Liaison Special Aviation Group (OAGS) (Russian: Особую авиагруппу связи) was created from the 2nd MAGON squadron and the 200th detachment of the GVF Moscow leadership, located at the Moscow airfield of Myachkov.
The 16 PS-43 were sent there in flying condition. Another had been lost by October. The last PS-43 entered the group in December. By the end of 1941 all operational PS-43s were in front units.
In the winter of 1941-1942 PS -43s participated in the Leningrad airlift.
By the spring of 1942, a high number of accidents and breakages began to be recorded, linked to the need to use pilots with little experience due to the start in front of those with more experience. In the second four-month period of that year, eight accidents occurred in which one of the planes was totally destroyed.
By May 1, 1942, three PS-43 were registered with the Kiev aviation group, 13 with the OAGS and another copy was in Grosny where it had landed after the evacuation of Ukraine, being used by the flight school of the VVS. This last example was reintegrated into the Caucasus-North group of the GVF, but on October 24, 1942, during a landing in Sochi, it was attacked by two Messerschmitt Bf-109, falling into the sea and killing the pilot Nikonov and his passenger.
In 1942, all the PS-43 aircraft in service had their original North American shock absorbers replaced by the other Soviet-produced hydro-pneumatic ones, at the same time an antifreeze mixture began to be used for the landing gear retraction mechanism, since the oil used tended to condense at temperatures below 15ºC, which made it necessary to fly in winter with the gear extended.
At the end of 1942 the OAGS was converted into the 3rd Liaison Division. During the Battle of Stalingrad they were used as liaison and mail transport planes, unloading in Astrakhan from where the delivery continued with Polikarpov R-5s.
The number of PS-43s in the division gradually decreased, mainly due to enemy attacks and accidents.
By January 1, 1943, 14 PS-43s were available and by December of that year the number was 12: on March 12, the pilot Yegupov, flying at low speed, became entangled with the cables of a ship’s mast, dying along with its passenger and on April 29 another PS-43 was attacked by a Messerschmitt during takeoff from Krasnodar.
The plane caught fire, both its pilot VI Timofeyev and its mechanic were hospitalized with severe burns. However, it is fair to note that due to its all-metal construction, the PS-43 aircraft were quite resistant and could receive a high level of damage.
By July 1, 1944, only nine examples of the PS-43 were in service and by the end of the year only eight. Three examples in January 1945 were based in Lvov being used in mail transfer roles for the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 1st Belorussian Front. Two others were located in Minsk and Kaunas, working with the 1st Pribaltic Front and the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts.
At the beginning of 1945, Douglas A-20 and North American B-25 aircraft received through the Lend-Lease Act began to enter the 3rd Liaison Division. This made it possible to begin deregistering the oldest PS-43. By the month of September, not a single copy of the PS-43 was operational in the USSR.
BSh-1
Power plant: 1 x М-62ИР. 1000 nominal power and 840 hp at height.
Wingspan: 15.25 m
Wing area: 35.07 m²
Length: 11.40m
Height: 3.05m
Empty weight: 2911 kg
Normal takeoff weight: 4056 kg
Maximum speed at sea level: 318 km/h
Maximum speed at altitude: 339 km/h
Practical range: 1700 km
ROC: 435 m/min
Practical ceiling: 7200 m
Accommodation: 2 – 3
Armament: 4 x 7.62-mm ShKAS machine guns, 3600 rounds, MV-3 turret above and MV-2 below.
Bombload: 400 kg
PS-43
Power plant: 1 x М-62ИР. 1000 nominal power and 840 hp at height.
Wingspan: 15.25 m
Wing area: 35.07 m²
Length: 11.40m
Height: 3.05m
Empty weight: 2911 kg
Normal takeoff weight: 4056 kg
Maximum speed at sea level: 318 km/h
Maximum speed at altitude: 339 km/h
Practical range: 1700 km
ROC: 435 m/min
Practical ceiling: 7200 m
Accommodation: 2 – 3
All Aero 